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Abstract 
Privacy has become the key concern of many users when they are confronted with friend requests 
on online social networking websites. Nonetheless, users’ responses to friend requests seem at 
times inconsistent with their concerns about potential privacy implications. They accept friend 
requests and expose their personal profiles to largely unfamiliar others even though they are aware 
of the risks involved. Drawing on impression formation theory and the privacy calculus 
perspective, this paper elucidates the intriguing roles of privacy risks and expected social capital 
gains in social connectivity management by examining the key types of social information that 
users consider and their behavioral responses to online friend requests. We conducted a scenario-
based experiment with 141 subjects. Our results indicate that individuals utilize two key types of 
social information; namely, network mutuality and profile diagnosticity in evaluating privacy risks 
and expected social capital gains. In addition, we find that privacy risks and expected social 
capital gains powerfully predict the likelihood of no-action and the likelihood of accepting friend 
requests on online social networking websites. In sum, this study contributes to the information 
systems literature by integrating impression formation theory and the privacy calculus perspective 
to identify the key types of social information that influence privacy tradeoff and predict 
individuals’ behavioral responses toward establishing new online social connections. 
Keywords: online social connectivity management, privacy risks, expected social capital gains, 
network mutuality, profile diagnosticity 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, online social networks have become 
nearly as universal as the Internet itself—with 
Facebook having 1.94 billion active users (statista, 
2017). Increasing evidence suggests that the 
development of new network relationships is one of 
the key motivators for using online social networks 
(e.g., Yan & Tan, 2014). For instance, on Facebook, a 
new social network connection (SNC) or friendship is 
formed when a user’s (i.e., requester) friend request is 
accepted by the intended recipient (i.e., request 
responder) (Boyd & Heer, 2006). The request 
responder typically responds to the friend request 
based on an impression of the requester, which can be 
formed based on the personal and network 
information available on the requester’s personal 
profile (Sunnafrank & Ramirez, 2004). Overall, the 
establishment of SNC is an important issue not just to 
service providers but also to users in developing new 
online relationships. 
How online relationships are developed and 
maintained has been a salient topic in information 
systems (IS) research (e.g., Choi, Jiang, Xiao, & Kim, 
2015; Jiang, Heng, & Choi, 2013; Kim, Chan, & 
Kankanhalli, 2012). However, prior research has 
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mostly examined relationship maintenance in online 
environments such as online communities, discussion 
forums, and chat rooms. The unique characteristics of 
online social networks could engender both 
similarities and differences in establishing new 
relationships, in comparison to other online 
environments. Like other online relationships, online 
social networking relationships typically involve the 
exchange of personal information; while such 
exchanges are vital to developing meaningful 
relationships, they also threaten information privacy 
(Choi et al., 2015). Thus, regardless of the online 
environment where users initiate relationships, 
information privacy is expected to be a similarly 
prevalent concern (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & 
Loewenstein, 2015). However, establishing online 
social network connections also differs from initiating 
other online relationships in several ways. First, other 
online relationships often involve largely unknown 
others. For example, online chat rooms involve 
relationships among anonymous individuals 
(Mileham, 2007) who can only be identified through 
avatars and/or nicknames. In online social networks, 
however, prior to initiating the connection, 
individuals typically have access to some basic 
identity information, such as profile pictures, gender, 
and lists of friends (Ellison, Hancock, & Toma, 
2012), which they can use to estimate the potential 
threat to their privacy. Second, in other online 
environments users typically develop and maintain 
similar relationship types, and the coexistence of 
multiple relationship types is generally uncommon. In 
contrast, researchers have identified the convergence 
of multiple relationship types as a major privacy 
challenge in online social networks (Ellison et al., 
2012). Furthermore, in similarity to offline 
relationship development, online relationships 
generally advance with a gradual escalation of 
information exchange, which can be regulated to 
protect privacy (Jiang et al., 2013). However, 
concerning online social networks, since personal 
profiles may contain a chronological archive of 
personal information and past activities, establishing 
online social network connections can 
instantaneously expose a thorough account of 
individuals to unfamiliar others. Collectively, these 
unique privacy implications in establishing online 
social connections warrant careful investigation. 
Past IS research has substantially advanced our 
understanding of individuals’ technology usage 
concerning privacy (e.g., Choi et al., 2015; Jiang et 
al., 2013; Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011). While IS 
literature has explored several aspects of privacy-
related behavior, it has focused primarily on usage 
behavior during online commercial transactions (e.g., 
Sutanto, Tan, & Fang, 2013; Tsai, Egelman, Cranor, 
& Aquisti, 2011). As a result, we know of little 
research that has focused on privacy-related behavior 
beyond the rim of commercial transactions. 
Therefore, the theoretical framing of our study will 
address the particular attributes of online social 
interactions. For example, in performing commercial 
transactions, individuals typically focus on 
completing purchases and hence pay attention to 
transaction specific information, such as aftersales 
services and payment options. However, in 
developing online social network connections, 
individuals are likely to look beyond a specific 
exchange and contemplate subsequent interactions. 
As a result, they can be motivated to consider a wide 
variety of social information, such as self-generated 
information (e.g., self-disclosure in personal profile), 
friend-generated information (e.g., comments), and 
system-generated information (e.g., number of 
friends) (e.g., Choi et al., 2015). The impact of such a 
rich range of social information on online social 
network connection establishment warrants careful 
investigation. Hence, our first research question is: 
What are the key types of impression-related 
information that a request responder considers in 
establishing new online social network connections? 
Since assessing new online social network 
connections entails impression formation, impression 
formation theory (Fisk & Neuberg, 1990) offers a 
suitable overarching framework. This theory helps us 
identify key impression-related information 
considered in the process of forming impressions, and 
clarifies how the outcome of this process influences 
the development of social relationships. Specifically, 
drawing on impression formation theory, this study 
focuses on two key categories of social information: 
namely, category-based information and attribute-
based information, which are both essential to 
forming impressions of the requester.  
Privacy research has devoted much attention to assessing 
the costs and benefits associated with privacy (e.g., Jiang 
et al., 2013; Sutanto et al., 2013). Most of these studies 
have advanced the general understanding of privacy 
calculus, while focusing on the tradeoff between privacy 
risks and certain tangible benefits (e.g., Dinev & Hart, 
2006; Xu, Teo, Tan, & Agarwal, 2010). It is important to 
note that past research has mainly focused on how two 
interactants develop relationships (e.g., Jiang et al., 
2013). However, new social network connections 
involve not only dyadic relationships, but also 
potentially instigate social exchanges between two 
different social circles. Hence, the second research 
question is: What are the specific privacy risks and 
benefits that a request responder evaluates in 
establishing new online social network connections? To 
this end, this paper integrates past privacy research and 
the social network literature to investigate the request 
responder’s cost-benefit evaluations related to 
establishing new online social network connections. In 
terms of cost evaluation, this paper draws on the privacy 
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literature to explain how the request responder’s privacy 
can be threatened by accepting a friend request. In terms 
of benefit evaluation, this paper relies on the social 
network literature to understand the impact of online 
social network connections on the social resources 
available to the request responder. Research in the 
interpersonal communication domain offers insight into 
the impact of cost-benefit evaluations. For example, Karl 
and Peluchette (2011) revealed that users were more 
inclined to reject friend requests when they were 
concerned about malicious usage of their profile 
information.  
Past privacy research has also highlighted that in the 
process of evaluating a privacy calculus, individuals 
typically struggle with information overload and 
limited cognitive resources, and hence are vulnerable 
to evaluating information less carefully and becoming 
subject to heuristic and cognitive biases (Choi et al., 
2015). Instead of carefully performing a privacy 
calculus evaluation, individuals might take mental 
shortcuts (e.g., dispositions) to bypass the cognitive 
challenges. Indeed, according to Dinev, McConnell, 
and Smith (2015), individuals’ sensitivity to privacy 
(e.g., self-relevancy and motivation to protect) could 
cause differential impacts on behavioral reactions 
concerning the effects of a privacy tradeoff. For 
example, Smith et al. (2011) noted that certain 
individuals typically discounted the risk of disclosing 
personal information (e.g., identity theft) if the risk 
was invisible or spread over time, while focusing on 
the immediate benefits of disclosure (e.g., 
convenience of placing orders online). Collectively, 
emerging evidence hints at the role of privacy 
dispositions in shaping the intricate joint influence of 
perceived risk and benefit on privacy related 
behaviors. Hence, to better understand the interplay 
between individuals’ privacy dispositions and privacy 
calculus, the third research question is: What is the 
role of dispositional privacy concerns in shaping the 
impacts of privacy calculus on behavioral reactions?  
Finally, the traditional view of information privacy 
focuses on privacy issues associated with explicit 
self-disclosure (Jiang et al. 2013). Recent studies 
examining information privacy suggest that an 
individual’s privacy calculus determines a range of 
response behaviors to protect privacy (e.g., Choi et 
al., 2015). However, while shedding light on privacy 
protective behaviors, the privacy literature offers 
limited insight into individuals’ behavioral responses 
to establishing online social network connections. 
Thus, the fourth research question is: What are the 
behavioral strategies that a request responder 
performs in response to new online social network 
connections? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 comprehensively reviews the previous 
literature and discusses the theoretical foundations of 
this paper. Section 3 discusses the research model and 
hypotheses. Sections 4 and 5 elaborate the research 
methodology and data analysis. This paper concludes 
with discussions of theoretical and practical 
contributions, limitations, and avenues for future 
research in Section 6.  
2 Literature Review 
In this section, we develop our theoretical perspective 
on online social network connection establishment. 
We begin by reviewing impression formation theory, 
which serves as the overarching framework of this 
research. We then turn to the literature on social 
relationship development to identify the key 
impression information that a responder considers in 
forming online social network connections. 
Furthermore, we discuss extant privacy research and 
the social network literature to understand the 
responder’s cost-benefit evaluation. 
2.1 Impression Formation Theory 
Impression formation is a psychological process that 
describes how an individual attempts to evaluate 
another person in a social interaction. According to 
impression formation theory, the process of 
interpersonal evaluation begins when an interactant 
presents him/herself in a social interaction. The other 
individual typically attempts to process social 
information to develop an impression of the 
interactant. Depending on the individual’s 
evaluations, positive impressions are typically met 
with positive responses, whereas negative 
impressions are often detrimental to relationship 
development. Past research examining relationship 
development has recognized that individuals often 
face a formidable array of social information used to 
form interpersonal impressions. The impression 
formation process is manageable only by selectively 
attending to certain types of social information.  
Through selective attention, individuals might assign 
social information to cognitive categories, which are 
abstract representations of conceptually related 
information. Indeed, in their seminal works on 
impression formation theory, Fisk and Neuberg 
(1990) consider category-based information and 
attribute-based information as the key types of social 
information that individuals interpret in forming 
impressions. Specifically, they posit that interpersonal 
impression is jointly determined by category-based 
information processing and attribute-based 
information processing. In the following sections, we 
discuss these two key types of social information. 
2.1.1 Category-Based Information 
Category-based information refers to heuristic 
information that cues relationship categories in the 
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initial stage of impression formation (Fisk & 
Neuberg, 1990). Past research examining social 
cognition suggests that individuals often focus on 
immediately available informational cues to 
categorize a target person. Once categorized, 
expectations associated with the category are 
activated and form the basis for the impression of the 
target person. Extant empirical research has 
considered a broad array of category-based 
information in impression development. For instance, 
Kunda and Thagard (1996) examined impression 
formation in social interactions and found that 
individuals typically stereotype other social 
interactants based on readily available information, 
such as skin color, appearance, and attire. Likewise, 
Freeman and Ambaby (2011) revealed that 
individuals often developed initial impressions of 
others based on apparent face and body cues, such as 
sex, race, and age. 
Hayes and Barnes-Holmes (2004) posit that category-
based information triggers social categorization by 
invoking relational frames stored in memory. 
Relational frames are a set of cognitions about a 
relationship group, such as stereotypes and 
relationship schema (Weinstein, Wilson, Drake, & 
Kellum, 2008). Researchers suggest that category-
based information facilitates sense-making by 
providing mechanisms for comprehending relational 
communications. For example, in a vignette study, 
Solomon, Dillard, and Andersen (2002) examined the 
role of heuristic information in elucidating social 
interactions. Specifically, the authors found that 
heuristic information that implied social interactions 
with similar others (e.g., common social circles) 
triggered a relational frame for close relationships, 
whereas heuristic information that implied 
interactions with dissimilar others (e.g., distinct social 
circles) activated the relational frame for distant 
relationships. Furthermore, individuals interpreted 
relational approaches (i.e., friend requests) based on 
the activated relational frame. With the relational 
frame for close relationship activated, relational 
approaches were typically thought to be friendly. 
Conversely, if the relational frame for distant 
relationship triggered, individuals considered 
relational approaches with prudence. 
2.1.2 Attribute-Based Information 
Whereas category-based information facilitates 
impression formation through relationship categories, 
attribute-based information refers to other noticeable 
information specific to the requester that requires 
more elaborate processing beyond initial relationship 
categorization, and activates individualization in 
social information processing (Fisk & Neuberg, 
1990). Unlike category-based information, which is 
often readily available, attribute-based information is 
typically acquired only through observation and 
careful diagnosis. For instance, in the earlier 
mentioned study, Kunda and Thagard (1996) found 
that individuals carefully synthesized attribute-based 
information by observing others’ behaviors in 
developing impressions. More importantly, initial 
stereotypes that individuals formulated using 
immediately available category-based information 
shaped how they subsequently interpreted attribute-
based information to form impressions. 
By considering others’ specific attributes 
systematically, individuals are more likely to develop 
a deep understanding of others. For example, Spears 
and Lea (1992) noted that specific attribute-based 
information was essential in forming impressions of 
idiosyncratic others. Specifically, the author revealed 
that attribute-based information helped emphasize 
interpersonal distinctions in the online environment, 
and hence independently accentuated others’ identity. 
Tanis and Postmes (2003) examined how profile 
content affects impression formation and found that 
the availability of profile pictures and a biography 
substantially reduced impression ambiguity. More 
importantly, it was found that the availability of 
attribute-based information led to a positive 
impression of the target. Overall, extant studies reveal 
the importance of rich attribute-based information in 
forming concrete interpersonal impressions. 
Collectively, past research has thoroughly 
demonstrated the importance of both category-based 
information and attribute-based information in 
impression formation (see Appendix). It is worthy to 
note that category-based information is typically 
accessible and readily available, whereas attribute-
based information is often available only through 
explicit deliberation. As a result, when category-
based information is available up front, it often 
influences how individuals interpret attribute-based 
information to form impressions. 
2.2 Privacy Calculus and 
Establishment of Online Social 
Network Connections 
The conceptualization of privacy and the examination 
of privacy-related behavioral outcomes have long 
been a focus of information privacy research (e.g., 
Hong & Thong, 2013; Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 
2004), which has identified a myriad of determinants 
of privacy perceptions in both offline and online 
environments. In an interdisciplinary review of 
privacy-related research, Smith et al. (2011) 
integrated the major privacy perspectives to propose 
an integrative privacy-specific framework; namely, 
the antecedents-privacy concerns-outcomes (APCO) 
model. Specifically, the model posits that individuals’ 
responses to external stimuli result in a deliberate 
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privacy calculus that leads to fully informed privacy-
related behaviors.  
Within the APCO model, privacy antecedents are 
features of the privacy decision-making context (e.g., 
a friend request episode) that individuals consider in 
order to perform privacy calculus. While privacy 
antecedents might be explicated in different 
contextual factors, past privacy studies have 
demonstrated the importance of identity-related 
information in online social interactions. For 
example, Jiang et al. (2013) found that the anonymity 
of others was an important antecedent of individuals’ 
privacy calculus in developing online relationships. 
Specifically, they found that the anonymity of others 
increased individuals’ concerns about privacy and 
decreased their evaluation of social rewards. 
Essentially, in developing online social relationships, 
privacy antecedents subsume social information (e.g., 
identity-related information) that is vital to privacy 
calculus. 
Privacy calculus is a psychological process that 
weighs the costs associated with privacy loss against 
the potential benefits derived through privacy 
exposure (Dinev et al., 2015). The central tenet of the 
privacy calculus perspective is that privacy 
transactions are evaluated in economic terms. 
Essentially, when individuals encounter a privacy 
situation, they perform a cost-benefit analysis to 
assess the outcomes they would face in return for 
exposing personal information, and then develop 
behavioral reactions accordingly (Hui, Teo, & Lee, 
2007).  
While past research has considered a variety of risks 
and gains, it has suggested that privacy risks and 
expected social capital gains are particularly relevant 
to individuals’ behavior concerning their personal 
information in social settings. Privacy risks exemplify 
individuals’ beliefs concerning the extent to which 
their privacy is open to exploitation (Xu, Dinev, & 
Hart, 2011). Typically, privacy risks have been 
regarded as a countervailing force to positive 
interpersonal evaluation when situational 
contingencies create feelings of uncertainty, 
discomfort, or anxiety (Luo, Li, Zhang, & Shim, 
2010). Consistent with extant research, this study 
defines privacy risks as threats to personal 
information associated with the establishment of 
online social network connections. This type of 
privacy risk is particularly important because the 
establishment of online social network connections 
exposes individuals’ private space to unforeseen 
dangers. For instance, in a study examining privacy 
calculus in online social networking, Dienlin and 
Metzger (2016) found that individuals evaluated risks 
to privacy against the perceived benefits of using 
Facebook in determining their disclosure and 
withdrawal behaviors. Likewise, Sun, Wang, Shen, 
and Zhang (2015) found that individuals’ privacy 
could be threatened when they disclosed their 
location to online social network friends, which might 
consist of both well-known friends and largely-
unknown acquaintances. 
Whereas privacy risks represent the potential 
repercussions of establishing new social connections, 
expected social capital gains represent the relational 
benefits individuals expect in allowing access to 
private space. Expected social capital gains are 
defined as the estimated increase in relational support 
derived through relationship development (Coleman, 
1988). Past research has regarded expected gains in 
social capital as the main enticement for individuals 
to engage in social interactions (e.g., Wang, Moon, 
Kwon, & Evans, 2010). By establishing social 
connections, individuals can draw on additional 
resources from others’ social networks. These 
resources can take the form of useful information, 
personal relationships, or socioemotional support. 
Researchers have considered individuals’ expectation 
of social capital gains to be an important component 
in their cost-benefit evaluation concerning online 
social networking. For instance, Ellison et al. (2012) 
revealed that social capital gains resulting from 
creating social connections were the most important 
benefits of online social networks.  
While researchers believe privacy risks to be a prime 
inhibitor to online social networking, they have also 
found responder’s expected social capital gains to be 
a major driver of developing social connections. On 
the one hand, researchers suggest that privacy risks 
motivate avoidance to social connections. For 
example, Posey and Ellis (2007) noted that users of 
online social networks were particularly prudent in 
establishing social relationships when they faced high 
privacy risks. On the other hand, social capital gains 
also entice responders to accept connections on online 
social networking websites. For instance, in a study 
on interpersonal connections, Ellison et al. (2012) 
noted that the development of social network 
connections was motivated by expected social capital 
gains, such as additional emotional support, and 
exposure to diverse ideas. Overall, privacy risks and 
expected social capital gains, which represent the two 
components in the responder’s privacy calculus, are 
particularly important in determining responses to 
online social network requests. 
2.3 Privacy Dispositions and Privacy 
Calculus 
Past IS research has made significant progress in 
understanding individuals’ concerns for privacy. In 
particular, the majority of extant studies has focused 
on dispositional privacy concerns, which refer to 
individuals’ overall concerns about opportunistic 
behavior related to disclosing personal information in 
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the online social networking environment (Smith, 
Milberg, & Burke, 1996). Despite the established 
understanding of dispositional privacy concerns, 
some evidence suggests that individuals’ dispositional 
privacy concerns might not be entirely sufficient in 
explaining privacy-related behavior in a specific 
privacy calculus. Indeed, several scholars underscore 
the importance of considering transaction-specific 
privacy concerns in explaining individuals’ privacy 
calculus. For example, Ackerman and Mainwaring 
(2005) suggest that individuals develop highly 
divergent privacy concerns in different privacy 
situations. The authors pointed out that while 
individuals might be extremely concerned about 
privacy on healthcare websites, they might be much 
less sensitive to privacy issues on online social 
networking websites. 
Recent IS research has started to formally recognize 
the transactional aspect of privacy calculus. For 
instance, Xu, Teo, Tan, and Agarwal (2012) showed 
that individuals’ dispositional privacy concerns 
reflect their inherent needs and attitudes toward 
maintaining privacy, whereas transaction-specific 
privacy perceptions focus on specific assessments of 
privacy weighing privacy needs against information 
disclosure during a transaction. In essence, 
dispositional privacy concerns reflect individuals’ 
basic beliefs about privacy, which are typically stable 
across various encounters with technologies. Privacy 
calculus, however, focuses on how individuals 
evaluate privacy in a specific online exchange 
involving personal information. Hence, privacy 
calculus is typically context-specific and formed in 
accordance with each unique privacy encounter. 
Overall, in the spirit of past privacy research, this 
paper considers privacy calculus in terms of 
individuals evaluating their privacy concerns prior to 
establishing new social network connections. 
Specifically, in terms of privacy calculus, privacy 
risks represent the cost evaluation and the expected 
social capital gains represent the benefit evaluation. 
In terms of privacy disposition, this study investigates 
the role of dispositional privacy concerns for shaping 
the impacts of privacy calculus on behavioral 
reactions toward establishing online social network 
connections. 
3 Research Model and 
Hypothesis Development 
The research model draws on impression formation 
theory as the overarching framework to explain 
individuals’ behavioral reactions to establishing 
online social network connections (see Figure 1). 
Specifically, consistent with the theory, this study 
examines two types of social information; namely, 
category-based information and attribute-based 
information, as the antecedents of privacy calculus. 
Corresponding to the important role of category-
based information in impression formation, network 
mutuality reflects how the responder’s evaluation of a 
friend request activates relationship categories. 
Network mutuality refers to the degree to which the 
responder and the requester share common 
interpersonal connections (Rogers & Kincaid, 1981). 
Based on the influence of attribute-based information 
on impression formation, we examine the notion of a 
requester’s profile diagnosticity to understand how 
profile information triggers individualization in 
interpersonal evaluation. Profile diagnosticity refers 
to how much detailed information is contained in the 
requester’s profile. 
We investigate the effects of these two independent 
variables on the responder’s privacy calculus in terms 
of perceived privacy risks and expected social capital 
gains in establishing connections with the unfamiliar 
requester. Emerging privacy research has also 
revealed the distinction between privacy calculus and 
privacy dispositions. Therefore, this study focuses on 
dispositional privacy concerns, which underscores 
individuals’ general belief associated with privacy 
challenges in online social networks, and examines 
how it moderates between individuals’ privacy 
calculus and their behavioral responses. 
Finally, we predict that privacy risks and expected 
social capital gains influence the privacy-related 
behaviors of no-action and acceptance concerning 
online social network connection management. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
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3.1 Determinants of Privacy Risks 
According to the principle of homophily, similarity in 
interpersonal connections increases ease of 
communication, improves predictability of behavior, 
and fosters trust and reciprocity between interactants 
(McPerson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). A 
responder who overlaps social networks with a 
requester may be more likely to share a common 
perspective regarding relationship development, and 
such commonality would reduce the risks of 
developing connections. The social cohesion 
engendered by network mutuality would reduce the 
likelihood that a requester would engage in exploitive 
behavior, and hence would reduce the risks to the 
responder’s privacy. For example, Ashleigh and 
Nandhakumar (2007) showed that individuals who 
shared highly interconnected social networks had 
significantly higher levels of confidence, respect, and 
commitment than those who shared less 
interconnected networks. Thus, we predict:  
H1a: Compared to low network mutuality between 
requester and responder, high network mutuality 
leads to lower responder privacy risks. 
In addition to network mutuality, we expect privacy 
risks to be influenced by requester’s profile 
diagnosticity. By establishing profile connectivity, the 
responder initiates, develops, and maintains an 
interpersonal relationship with the requester. 
Researchers have noted the importance of personal 
profiles in the initial stage of relationship 
development. For example, Ellison et al. (2012) 
examined the importance of personal profiles on 
online dating websites. They found that 
comprehensive profile information served as a 
concrete psychological contract, which ensured that 
social interactions would take shape in mutually 
agreed upon and equitable manner. In sum, when a 
requester’s profile diagnosticity is high, the responder 
may develop a rich understanding of the requester, 
reducing privacy risks with regards to establishing 
social network connection. Therefore, we posit: 
H1b: Compared to low requester profile diagnosticity, 
high requester profile diagnosticity leads to 
lower responder privacy risks. 
Relational framing theory (RFT) suggests that 
individuals extract relational meaning from social 
information based on relational frames, which can be 
triggered by social category cues (Dillard, Kinney, & 
Cruz, 1996). For example, Solomon et al. (2002) 
examined the effects of relational frames on social 
interactions and found that individuals’ general 
attachment orientations influenced their interpretation 
of specific exchange in social episodes. 
Accordingly, we postulate an interaction effect of 
network mutuality and requester’s profile 
diagnosticity on privacy risks. When network 
mutuality is high, a relational frame for close 
relationships is activated, which not only suppresses 
the responder’s uncertainty in interpretation but also 
converges his/her focus in terms of social similarity 
with the requester—that is, the responder is likely to 
perceive the requester as someone who shares 
common interpersonal connections. Thus, in the high 
network mutuality condition, the responder might 
conveniently construct his/her impression of the 
requester based on network mutuality and be less 
motivated to consider specific profile information 
(Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse, Zukova, & Klauer, 
2003). In particular, in evaluating privacy risks, the 
responder might focus on the high commonality in 
online social networks and expect the requester to be 
similar to the responder’s friends in regulating and 
protecting privacy (Petronio, 2012). Furthermore, 
through high network mutuality, the responder might 
conjecture some social assurance that the requester is 
aware of the potential social repercussion for 
violating the responder’s privacy. In sum, when 
network mutuality is high, the effect of requester’s 
profile diagnosticity on perceived privacy risks is 
likely diminished. 
On the contrary, low network mutuality suggests less 
commonality in interpersonal relationships, which 
activates a relational frame for distant relationships 
(Dillard, Kinney, & Cruz, 1996). With the influence 
of this relational frame, the responder is likely to 
become more prudent in forming impressions of the 
requester. Such prudence motivates the responder to 
adopt a careful approach in which he or she considers 
all of the attribute-based information available in the 
requester’s personal profile. Further, the relational 
frame for distant relationships tends to be less 
informative and concrete (Bless, Schwarz, & 
Wieland, 1996). As a result, low network mutuality 
does not provide a sufficient basis for finalizing the 
responder’s impression of the requester. Thus, in low 
network mutuality condition, attribute-based 
information available in personal profiles is essential 
to the responder’s assessment of privacy risks. 
Compared to low requester profile diagnosticity, high 
requester profile diagnosticity connotes a more 
informative profile, and hence reduces privacy risks 
with regards to establishing social network 
connections. Specifically, low network mutuality 
connotes a lack of social assurance, and the responder 
is likely to be aware of the uncertainty concerning 
privacy in establishing a social network connection. 
In the case of low requester’s profile diagnosticity, 
the requester not only lacks indirect social assurance, 
but is also deprived of extensive personal information 
about the requester. As a result, the requester is likely 
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to be anxious about privacy concerning that online 
social network connection. In contrast, high requester 
profile diagnosticity implies that extensive 
information about the requester is available. The 
requester might develop a more concrete 
understanding about the requester’s attitude toward 
protecting the responder’s privacy. Thus, drawing on 
RFT, we predict the following interaction effect: 
H1c: There is an interaction effect on privacy risks 
between network mutuality and requester 
profile diagnosticity—i.e., in comparison to the 
low network mutuality condition, the high 
network mutuality condition reduces the effect 
of requester profile diagnosticity on privacy 
risks. 
3.2 Determinants of Expected Social 
Capital Gains 
In addition to evaluating privacy risks, category-
based information is important to the responder’s 
assessment of expected social capital gains in 
establishing social network connections. In online 
social networks, network mutuality is a concise 
representation of similarity in social networks as well 
as commonality in interpersonal relationships. In 
general, most responders would prefer to develop 
relationships with those of high network mutuality. 
Research on interpersonal relationships has 
consistently uncovered strong links between network 
mutuality and liking, which is also termed the 
similarity effect. Further, researchers have also noted 
that high network mutuality induces perceptual 
biases, which cause individuals to overestimate the 
degree of interpersonal similarity (Montoya, Horton, 
& Kirchner, 2008). More importantly, according to 
the network cohesion perspective (Cohen & 
Hoberman, 1983), high network mutuality is 
indicative of a high degree of network cohesion, 
which suggests a highly collegial environment in 
which the responder might obtain socioemotional 
support. Therefore, compared to low network 
mutuality, the responder would expect larger social 
capital gains through establishing online social 
network connections with a requester of high network 
mutuality. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2a: Higher network mutuality leads to higher 
expected social capital gains. 
From a social penetration perspective, when an 
unfamiliar requester reveals him/herself through self-
disclosure, the responder is better able to understand 
the requester and predict future behaviors (Srull & 
Wyer, 1989). When a relationship is initiated in 
offline contexts, the responder’s impression is 
typically formed based on direct assessment of 
attribute-based information, such as appearance and 
nonverbal cues (Tidwell & Walther, 2002). In online 
social networks, the lack of physical presence limits 
attribute-based information to the requester’s self-
disclosure in personal profiles. As a result, the 
responder must rely heavily on the requester’s 
diagnostic profile in assessing expected social capital 
gains. To illustrate, when profile diagnosticity is low, 
the requester presents very limited personal 
information. As a result, the responder likely has 
access to limited personal information, such as 
gender, birthday, and profile photos. In contrast, 
when profile diagnosticity is high, the requester 
reveals a rich range of personal information, such as 
multiple photo albums, educational background, and 
professional experiences. An abundance of personal 
information is essential to developing a thorough 
understanding of the requester’s social status, 
affiliations, and latent relationships. Accordingly, 
high requester profile diagnosticity is capable of 
inducing expectations of large social capital gains in 
establishing social network connections. For instance, 
Walther, Van Der Heide, Kim, Westerman, and Tong 
(2008) found that when profiles were highly 
comprehensive, individuals typically expected the 
online connection to be socially rewarding. On the 
contrary, when there were many missing details in 
profiles, individuals were less likely to expect a 
socially rewarding relationship. Thus, we predict: 
H2b: Higher requester profile diagnosticity leads to 
higher expected social capital gains. 
RFT highlights the importance of category-based 
information in forming individuals’ perception of 
benefits (Dillard et al., 1996). Within the framework 
of RFT, when individuals perceive relationship 
commonality with others, a relational frame for close 
relationships is activated, which dominates their 
evaluation of relationship development, and hence 
reduces their focus on attribute-based information 
(Gawronski et al., 2003). However, if individuals 
perceive difference in social connections, a relational 
frame for distant relationships is activated, which 
emphasizes prudence in developing relationships. 
Hence, individuals are likely to pay attention to 
attribute-based information. Specifically, when 
network mutuality is low, the responder will not 
expect a high degree of interpersonal similarity. As a 
result, the responder is more likely to rely on profile 
diagnosticity to evaluate the expected social capital 
gains in establishing social network connection. In the 
case of low profile diagnosticity, the responder is not 
likely to find insightful information about the 
requester, and hence it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to estimate the potential social capital 
gains. In contrast, in the case of high profile 
diagnosticity, the responder will be able to draw on a 
rich profile of information (i.e., social status, 
professional affiliations, and latent relationships) of 
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the requester to vividly establish the potential of 
social capital gains.  
According to RFT, therefore, when network mutuality 
is high, the responder feels assured that the requester 
would have common interests and share mutual 
understanding in developing relationships, thereby 
reducing the responder’s reliance on profile 
information in assessing social capital gains. In 
particular, high network mutuality is indicative of 
network cohesion, which implies a high likelihood of 
obtaining socioemotional support. Since the 
responder might draw on immediately available 
network mutuality information in evaluating expected 
social capital gains, the role of profile diagnosticity is 
likely less prevalent compared with low network 
mutuality. Thus, we propose: 
H2c: There is an interaction effect on expected social 
capital gains between network mutuality and 
requester profile diagnosticity—i.e., in 
comparison to the low network mutuality 
condition, the high network mutuality 
condition reduces the effect of requester profile 
diagnosticity on expected social capital gains. 
3.3 Privacy Calculus and Behavioral 
Responses 
Extending impression formation theory, this paper 
draws on Choi et al.’s (2015) classification to focus 
on two types of behavioral response to social network 
connection establishment; namely, no-action and 
acceptance. Whereas no-action represents a passive 
response to social network connection requests, 
acceptance subsumes the responder’s active responses 
in either agreement or disagreement (i.e., rejection). 
No-action refers to the responder’s adoption of the 
inaction strategy. Through performing no-action, the 
responder demonstrates disinterest in establishing a 
new social network connection with the unfamiliar 
requester. In contrast, acceptance is an active 
response that facilitates the development of online 
social connectivity by formally establishing the 
network connection between the two personal 
profiles. It is worthy to note that acceptance is 
typically the opposite of rejection, which allows the 
responder to dissociate from the requester in online 
social networking environments. 
3.3.1 Privacy Risks and Behavioral 
Responses 
Privacy risks highlight not just the probability of 
threats to privacy but also underscore the severity of 
the threat. No-action is not an effective behavioral 
strategy to address privacy risks because no-action 
maintains the responder’s exposure and expresses the 
responder’s tolerance to potential privacy 
implications (Choi et al., 2015). It is important to note 
that, while no-action toward friend requests does not 
further expose the responder to the requester, it might 
subject the responder to future harassment if the 
requester continues to make repetitive friend requests. 
Hence, privacy risks provide strong reasons for the 
responder to avoid no-action. 
Accepting a friend request can be risky because it 
represents the responder’s willingness to expose 
him/herself to the requester in online social networks. 
Much research suggests that in online social 
networks, relationship acceptance can be impeded by 
the responder’s perceptions of privacy risks in 
establishing social network connections. For example, 
Ellison et al. (2012) found that when individuals 
expected high privacy risks in establishing profile 
connections, they were more reserved toward friend 
requests. Hence, privacy risks are expected to reduce 
approach behavior. In sum, we hypothesize: 
H3a: Privacy risks will reduce the likelihood of no-
action. 
H3b: Privacy risks will reduce the likelihood of 
acceptance. 
3.3.2 Expected Social Capital Gains and 
Behavioral Responses 
According to the principle of economics, when 
individuals expect to gain from an exchange, they 
will be motivated to take explicit actions to realize the 
expected gains. Hence, when a responder expects 
social capital gains from establishing a new social 
network connection, he/she is likely to be enticed to 
act favorably toward the friend request. Therefore, the 
responder who expects social capital gains will be 
less likely to take no-action. 
A number of studies suggest that expected social 
capital gains significantly influence friend request 
acceptance. For example, Tong, Van Der Heide, 
Langwell, and Walther (2008) investigated 
relationship development in online social networks 
and found that the social resource gains that 
individuals expected from forming social ties with 
others increased their willingness to sustain 
interpersonal connections. These findings imply that 
the responder’s gains in social capital may induce 
acceptance in response to a friend request. 
Collectively, we posit: 
H4a: Expected social capital gains will reduce the 
likelihood of no-action. 
H4b: Expected social capital gains will increase the 
likelihood of acceptance. 
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3.4 The Interplay Between 
Dispositional Privacy Concerns 
and Privacy Calculus 
Past privacy research suggests that the underlying 
mechanics of privacy calculus on behavioral 
responses can be influenced by loss aversion, which 
subsumes individuals’ stronger preference for 
avoiding losses than for acquiring gains (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). The risk literature has produced 
substantial evidence on the inverse relationship 
between judgment of risks and judgment of benefits. 
The central tenant of the literature focuses on the 
cognitive biases, which suggest that individuals might 
discount the potential for benefits when the risk 
potential is high. Accordingly, when individuals are 
confronted with high risks in evaluating an uncertain 
issue, pressure toward avoiding risks would lead them 
to discount the potential benefits. Similarly, when 
evaluating a request for establishing a new social 
network connection when privacy risks are high, the 
responder will likely focus on the high privacy risks 
and overlook the potential social capital gains. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H5a: The effect of expected social capital gains on 
no-action is stronger when privacy risks are 
low than when privacy risks are high. 
H5b: The effect of expected social capital gains on 
acceptance is stronger when privacy risks are 
low than when privacy risks are high. 
Past IS research has largely assumed that privacy-
related behaviors are enacted through deliberate, 
high-effort processing. However, according to the 
privacy literature, privacy-related behaviors could 
also be performed based on low-effort processing, 
which typifies simple and relatively automatic 
cognitive heuristics as well as mental shortcuts. While 
a number of complex factors determine the level of 
cognitive effort being expended, past privacy research 
has emphasized the importance of dispositional 
privacy concerns. For instance, in a study examining 
adoption of electronic health records, Angst and 
Agarwal (2009) found that dispositional privacy 
concerns caused a differential impact on the effects of 
argument-framing and issue involvement concerning 
intentions to opt-in. Specifically, individuals with 
strong dispositional privacy concerns were highly 
critical when evaluating information associated with 
the usage of electronic health records, whereas those 
with weak dispositional privacy concerns were 
largely indifferent toward the privacy implications. 
Accordingly, we propose that dispositional privacy 
concerns moderate the impacts of privacy calculus on 
behavioral responses to social connectivity 
establishment. The notion of zero-value boundary in 
risk analysis (Grable, 2000) can explain the 
interactions between dispositional privacy concerns 
and privacy calculus. Specifically, according to the 
risk literature, if individuals have high risk 
propensity, they are willing to take chances with 
respect to the risk of loss and hence risks might be 
immaterial in the evaluation. To illustrate, most 
people understand the risk of financial losses in 
gambling, but gambling addicts may simply ignore 
the risk of loss.  
Similarly, we expect low dispositional privacy 
concerns to moderate the impacts of privacy calculus 
on behavioral responses. Specifically, a responder 
with low dispositional privacy concerns is essentially 
insensitive toward privacy issues in using online 
social networks. Accordingly, that responder is likely 
to pay little attention to privacy risks and may ignore 
the possibility of losing privacy when establishing 
new social network connections. Following the logic 
of cognitive biases, given the lower emphasis on 
privacy risks, that responder will be less likely to 
discount the potential social capital gains in accepting 
the friend request. In essence, when a responder has 
low dispositional privacy concerns, the importance of 
privacy risks in the privacy calculus is diminished, 
and hence the effect of privacy risks in moderating 
the impact of expected social capital gains on 
behavioral responses is likely reduced.  
In contrast, when a responder has high dispositional 
privacy concerns, the effect of privacy risks in 
moderating the impact of expected social capital 
gains on behavioral responses is expected to be 
amplified. Past privacy research has revealed 
individuals’ variations in allocating different weight 
to the cost and benefit components in privacy 
calculus. These findings broadly pointed at the role of 
general privacy sensitivity in amplifying the impact 
of loss, which reduces the effect of benefits in 
influencing privacy-related behavior. In particular, 
high dispositional privacy concerns represent the 
responder’s vulnerability to privacy issues and 
tendency to avoid risks. Accordingly, with high 
dispositional privacy concerns, the responder is likely 
to emphasize the importance of privacy risks. More 
importantly, since the highlighted pressure to avoid 
risk is likely to reduce the importance of benefits, we 
would expect the highlighted level of privacy risks to 
reduce the relevance of expected social capital gains 
in influencing the establishment of new social 
network connections. Collectively, we posit: 
H6: Compared to low dispositional privacy 
concerns, high dispositional privacy concerns 
will strengthen the negative moderating 
influence of privacy risks concerning the 
impact of expected social capital gains on 
acceptance. 
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4 Research Methodology 
We chose Facebook as the online social network 
platform for our study for two reasons: 1) Facebook 
facilitates establishment of social network 
connections by providing social information such as 
network mutuality and profile information; 2) 
Facebook’s high popularity allows for a greater 
generalizability of findings. 
4.1 Experimental Design 
We conducted a laboratory experiment with a 2 
(network mutuality: low vs. high) x 2 (profile 
diagnosticity: low vs. high) factorial design to test the 
proposed hypotheses. Network mutuality was 
manipulated by the number of shared friends the 
subject had in common with the requester. Recent 
research suggests that average Facebook users 
typically have about 17.5% of shared Facebook 
friends (Eldon, 2010). Accordingly, low network 
mutuality was represented as ≤5% of subjects’ 
reported number of Facebook friends, whereas high 
network mutuality was represented as ≥30% of the 
number of reported Facebook friends.  
We determined profile diagnosticity by manipulating 
the number of content items in the mock-up personal 
profile of the requester, mimicking actual Facebook 
layout. Evidence suggests that a typical Facebook 
user profile is about three years old, contains 1008 
photos and 756 status updates, and has received 828 
comments (Hampton, Goulet, Marlow, & Rainie, 
2012; Koc & Gulyagci, 2013). Therefore, low profile 
diagnosticity was represented using an experimental 
profile that contained 50 photos, 38 updates, and 41 
received comments. High profile diagnosticity was 
represented with a profile containing 1966 photos, 
1474 updates, and 1615 received comments. To 
control for the potential effect of the content nature 
and sequence of content presentation, the 
experimental profile was dynamically populated with 
content items that were randomly selected from a 
common content pool. To improve the realism of the 
experiment, we developed the profile content based 
on actual Facebook profile content contributed by 
students from the same university as the experiment 
participants. The content was deidentified and revised 
to reflect the identity of a generic university student. 
The experiment involved a simulation of a Facebook 
friend request using a hypothetical scenario—such 
simulations have been broadly used in prior IS and 
privacy research (e.g., Choi et al. 2015).  
A pilot test was conducted with 20 subjects (five 
subjects in each experimental condition) to verify the 
experimental protocols. In the pilot test, subjects were 
randomly assigned to an experimental condition and 
presented with the hypothetical friend request 
scenario on Facebook that was sent to them by an 
unfamiliar requester who had low (or high) network 
mutuality with the subjects and had a profile with low 
(or high) diagnosticity. Subjects were asked to 
imagine that the scenario was real and review the 
profile carefully. Upon completing the questionnaire, 
subjects were shown a mock-up environment (see 
Figure 2) and could respond (i.e., accept) or not 
respond (i.e., no-action) to the friend request. 
Additionally, subjects were instructed to complete an 
online survey that contained measurement items (7-
point Likert scales) to capture perceived realism and 
perceived relevance of the hypothetical scenario. 
Results suggest that the scenarios were highly 
realistic (mean = 6.12) and relevant to people like our 
subjects (mean = 5.78). 
4.2 Main Experiment 
Subjects were university students who had online 
social networking experience. One week prior to the 
experiment, subjects received an e-mail that 
instructed them to complete a prestudy survey. In this 
survey, subjects were asked to provide information 
about demographics, Internet experience, Facebook 
experience, and their number of Facebook friends. To 
verify subjects’ Facebook usage, they were asked to 
provide their profile names, which the researchers 
used to contact them on Facebook.  
We recruited 141 subjects to participate in the 
experiment. To enhance involvement, we asked 
subjects to log in to their actual Facebook accounts on 
a browser window. They were then randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions in 
an experimental Facebook environment that was 
modeled on the actual Facebook layout. On another 
browser window, we presented them with one of the 
four scenarios (i.e., varied across the two [low/high] 
categories of network mutuality and profile 
diagnosticity) where they received a friend request 
from an unfamiliar requester. 
Subjects were told to imagine that the scenario was 
real (i.e., they received the friend request on their 
actual Facebook accounts) and read through it 
carefully. They were also encouraged to carefully 
evaluate the profile content of the requester (i.e., 
number of mutual friends, photos, postings, and 
comments) and spend as much time as they needed. 
Afterwards, they were instructed to complete a 
questionnaire that contained manipulation checks and 
measurements of the mediating variables. Upon 
completing the questionnaire, subjects were shown a 
mock-up environment (see Figure 2) and asked to 
respond (or not to respond) to the friend request. In 
terms of responding to the request, they could either 
reject or accept the request. After completing the 
responses in the mock-up environment, we debriefed 
the subjects and thanked them. 
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Figure 2. Mock-Up Facebook Environment 
5 Data Analysis 
5.1 Subject Demographics and 
Background Analysis 
Among the 141 subjects, 67 were females. The age of 
the subjects ranged from 19 to 24, with average 
Internet experience and average Facebook experience 
of 7.2 years and 3.9 years respectively. The average 
number of reported Facebook friends was 203.1. The 
average time a subject spent on completing the entire 
experiment was 25 minutes. 
No significant differences were found among subjects 
randomly assigned to each of the four experimental 
conditions with respect to age, gender, Internet 
experience, Facebook experience, and number of 
Facebook friends, indicating that subjects’ 
demographics were quite homogeneous across 
different conditions. 
5.2 Measurements 
We conducted the manipulation check for network 
mutuality by asking responders to rate the extent to 
which they had common friends with the requester 
(see Table 1). On a seven-point Likert scale, 
responders in the low network mutuality condition 
reported a mean value of 2.03 for the extent of 
multiple social ties (standard deviation = 0.38) and 
responders in the high network mutuality condition 
reported a mean value of 5.51 for the extent of 
multiple social ties (standard deviation = 0.57). The 
difference was significant (t = -42.56, p <0.01), and 
hence the manipulation for network mutuality worked 
as anticipated. 
We conducted the manipulation check for requester 
profile diagnosticity by asking responders to rate the 
extent to which the requester’s personal profile 
provided detailed information about the person. On a 
seven-point Likert scale, responders in the low 
requester profile diagnosticity condition reported a 
mean value of 2.55 for the extent of profile detail 
(standard deviation = 0.50) and responders in the high 
requester profile diagnosticity condition reported a 
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mean value of 5.54 for the extent of profile detail 
(standard deviation = 0.56). The difference was 
significant (t = -33.38, p <0.01), and hence the 
manipulation for requester profile diagnosticity 
worked as anticipated. 
Table 1. Measurement Item 
Network mutuality (NM), developed based on Choi et al. (2015) 
NM1 The requester and I are connected through multiple friends on Facebook. 
NM2 The requester and I have many common friends on Facebook. 
NM3 The requester and I have highly similar social circles on Facebook. 
NM4 Many of my friends are friends of the requester on Facebook. 
Profile diagnosticity (PD), developed based on Jiang and Benbasat (2004) 
PD1 The requester’s profile is helpful for me to familiarize myself with him/her. 
PD2 The requester’s profile is helpful in influencing my overall evaluation of him/her. 
PD3 The requester’s profile is helpful in forming my judgment of him/her. 
PD4 The requester’s profile tells a lot about him/her. 
Privacy risks (PR), adapted from Xu, Teo, Tan, and Agarwal (2010) 
PR1 Establishing profile connectivity with the requester would involve many unexpected problems. 
PR2 It would be risky to establish profile connectivity with the requester. 
PR3 There would like high potential for loss in establishing profile connectivity with the requester. 
PR4 There would be too much uncertainty associated with establishing profile connectivity with the requester. 
PR5 I would feel safe establishing profile connectivity with the requester. (r) 
Expected social capital gains (ESCG), adapted from Lochner, Kawachi, and Kennedy (1999)  
ESCG1 Establishing profile connectivity with the requester would allow me to obtain additional socioemotional 
support from his/her social networks. 
ESCG2 Establishing profile connectivity is an important way to acquire additional instrumental support from the 
requester’s social networks. 
ESCG3 I consider establishing profile connectivity with the requester as one way of acquainting myself to his/her 
social networks, so that I may garner additional informational support. 
ESCG4 Establishing profile connectivity with the requester is an important way to allow me to rely on his/her 
social networks. 
Dispositional privacy concerns, adapted from Smith et al. (1996) 
Collection 
DPC-C1 It usually bothers me when online social networking websites ask me for personal information. 
DPC-C2 When online social networking websites ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice before 
providing it. 
DPC-C3 It bothers me to give personal information to unfamiliar others. 
DPC-C4 I’m concerned that online social networking websites are collecting too much personal information about 
me. 
Errors 
DPC-E1 All the personal information in computer database should be double-checked for accuracy—no matter 
how much this costs. 
DPC-E2 Online social networking websites should take more steps to make sure that the personal information in 
their files is accurate. 
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Table 1. Measurement Item 
DPC-E3 Online social networking websites should have better procedures to correct errors in personal 
information. 
DPC-E4 Online social networking websites should devote more time and effort to verifying the accuracy of the 
personal information in their databases. 
Unauthorized Access 
DPC-U1 Online social networking websites should devote more time and effort to preventing unauthorized access 
to personal information. 
DPC-U2 Computer databases that contain personal information should be protected from unauthorized access no 
matter how much it costs. 
DPC-U3 Online social networking websites should take more steps to make sure that unauthorized people cannot 
access personal information in their computers. 
Secondary Use 
DPC-S1 Online social networking websites should not use personal information for any purpose, unless they have 
been authorized by the individuals who provided the information. 
DPC-S2 When people give personal information to a company for some reasons, the company should never use 
the information for any other reason. 
DPC-S3 Online social networking websites should never sell the personal information in their computer databases 
to other online social networking websites. 
DPC-S4 Online social networking websites should never share personal information with other online social 
networking websites unless they have been authorized by the users who provided the information.  
Note: (r) reverse item. 
 
We adapted five items measuring privacy risks 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) from Xu et al. (2010) and 
we adapted four items measuring expected social 
capital gains (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) from Lochner 
et al. (1999) (see Table 1). The Concerns for 
Information Privacy (CFIP) scales (Smith et al. 1996) 
were used to measure dispositional privacy concerns. 
The CFIP scales capture privacy concerns as a 
second-order variable with four first-order factors; 
namely, collection, error, unauthorized access, and 
secondary use. Following Chin (1998) and past IS 
research (e.g., Jiang et al. 2013), we computed four 
sets of factor scores based on the four first-order 
constructs. We then considered these four factor 
scores as indicator variables for dispositional privacy 
concerns (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95). Exploratory 
factor analysis shows that, in general, items load well 
on their intended factor and lightly on the other 
factors, thus indicating adequate construct validity 
(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Rotated Factor-Item Loadings 
NM PD DPC PR ESCG 
NM1 0.92 0.10 0.02 -0.23 0.15 
NM2 0.91 0.04 0.08 -0.25 0.11 
NM3 0.87 0.11 0.03 -0.28 0.18 
NM4 0.83 0.14 0.07 -0.21 0.20 
PD1 0.05 0.91 0.10 -0.11 0.25 
PD2 0.06 0.85 0.11 -0.15 0.21 
PD3 0.08 0.87 0.05 -0.19 0.26 
PD4 0.10 0.81 0.14 -0.08 0.28 
DPC-COL 0.23 0.25 0.91 -0.21 -0.02 
DPC-ERR 0.14 0.21 0.96 -0.02 -0.09 
DPC-UA 0.16 0.26 0.96 0.01 -0.11 
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Table 2. Rotated Factor-Item Loadings 
DPC-SU 0.18 0.28 0.95 0.03 -0.08 
PR1 -0.22 -0.24 -0.01 0.75 -0.24 
PR2 -0.25 -0.29 -0.15 0.81 -0.18 
PR3 -0.21 -0.22 0.03 0.79 -0.26 
PR4 -0.20 -0.25 -0.03 0.84 -0.07 
PR5 -0.26 -0.27 -0.05 0.78 -0.16 
ESCG1 0.25 0.30 -0.13 -0.22 0.82 
ESCG2 0.19 0.29 -0.06 -0.20 0.85 
ESCG3 0.22 0.24 -0.02 -0.26 0.84 
ESCG4 0.27 0.27 -0.11 -0.13 0.88 
Notes: 
NM = network mutuality; PD = profile diagnosticity; DPC = dispositional privacy concerns; COL = DPC-collection; ERR = 
DPC-errors; UA = DPC-unauthorized access; SU = DPC-secondary use; PR = privacy risks; ESCG = expected social capital 
gains. 
 
Off-diagonal elements in Table 3 represent 
correlations of all latent variables, while the diagonal 
elements are the square roots of the average variances 
extracted (AVE) of the latent variables. Since the 
square roots of AVE of any latent variables are 
greater than the correlations shared between the latent 
variable and other latent variables, discriminant 
validity is deemed adequate. 
 
Table 3. Internal Consistency and Discriminant Validity of Constructs 
 CR CA M NM PD DPC PR ESCG 
NM 0.95 0.92 3.86 0.90     
PD 0.93 0.88 4.10 0.04 0.93    
DPC 0.96 0.95 4.98 0.20 0.24 0.89   
PR 0.93 0.89 4.16 -0.22 -0.26 -0.02 0.88  
ESCG 0.96 0.91 4.58 0.23 0.27 -0.05 -0.19 0.93 
 
5.3 Results on Privacy Risks 
We conducted multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) on both privacy risks and expected 
social capital gains. Results show that the treatment 
effects were significant (p <0.05); hence we also 
conducted analysis of variance (ANOVA) separately 
on the two dependent variables. 
ANOVA with privacy risks as dependent variable 
reveals that higher network mutuality significantly 
leads to lower privacy risks (F [1, 137] = 85.81, p 
<0.01) (see Table 4 and 5). Furthermore, requester’s 
profile diagnosticity was found to have a significant 
main effect on privacy risks (F [1, 137] = 28.03, p 
<0.01), meaning that compared to low requester’s 
profile diagnosticity, high requester’s profile 
diagnosticity reduces privacy risks. Hence, H1a and 
H1b are supported. 
Simple main effect analysis reveals that 1) high 
requester profile diagnosticity is associated with 
significantly lower privacy risk than low requester 
profile diagnosticity under the low network mutuality 
condition (F [1, 69] = 41.61, p <0.01), and 2) low 
requester profile diagnosticity and high requester 
profile diagnosticity are not different from each other 
in affecting privacy risks under the high network 
mutuality condition (F [1, 68] = 1.12, p =0.16) (see 
Table 4 and 5; Figure 3). Therefore, H1c is supported. 
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Table 4. ANOVA Results on Privacy Risks 
Source Type III sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
Overall sample 
NM 
 
85.81 
 
1 85.81 101.90 
 
.000 
PD 28.03 1 28.03 33.28 .000 
NM * PD 14.40 1 14.40 17.10 .000 
Error 115.37 137 .84   
Total 2583.08 141    
NM=Low      
 PD 41.61 1 41.61 36.71 .000 
 Error 78.21 69 1.13   
 Total 1790.40 71    
NM=High      
 PD 1.12 1 1.12 2.04 .158 
 Error 37.16 68 .55   
 Total 792.68 70    
Notes: dependent variable: privacy risks; NM = network mutuality; PD = profile diagnosticity. 
R squared = .529 (adjusted R squared = .518) 
 
Table 5. Mean Values of Privacy Risks 
 Low PD High PD Mean 
Low NM 5.61 3.41 4.51 
High NM 4.07 3.15 3.61 
Mean 4.84 3.28  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Plot of Privacy Risks 
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5.4 Results on Capital Social Gains 
ANOVA with expected social capital gains as 
dependent variable reveals that higher network 
mutuality significantly leads to higher expected social 
capital gains (F [1, 137] = 29.79, p <0.01) (see Table 
6 and 7). Further, requester profile diagnosticity is 
found to have a significant main effect on expected 
social capital gains (F [1, 137] = 80.28, p <0.01), 
meaning that compared to low requester profile 
diagnosticity, high requester profile diagnosticity 
increases expected social capital gains (see Table 6 
and 7; Figure 4). Hence, H2a and H2b are supported. 
Simple main effect analysis reveals that 1) high 
requester profile diagnosticity is associated with 
significantly higher expected social capital gains than 
low requester’s profile diagnosticity under the low 
network mutuality condition (F [1, 69] = 160.54, p 
<0.01), and 2) low requester profile diagnosticity and 
high requester profile diagnosticity are not different 
from each other in affecting expected social capital 
gains under the high network mutuality condition (F 
[1, 68] = .41, p =0.51). Therefore, H2c is supported. 
 
Table 6. ANOVA Results on Expected Social Capital Gains 
Source Type III sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig. 
Overall sample 
NM 
 
29.79 
 
1 29.79 33.32 
 
.000 
PD 71.77 1 71.77 80.28 .000 
NM * PD 88.00 1 88.00 98.44 .000 
Error 122.47 137 .89   
Total 3134.13 141    
NM=Low      
 PD 160.54 1 160.54 184.19 .000 
 Error 60.14 69 .87   
 Total 1358.69 71    
NM=High      
 PD .41 1 .41 .45 .506 
 Error 62.33 68 .92   
 Total 1775.44 70    
Notes: dependent variable: privacy risks; NM = network mutuality; PD = profile diagnosticity. 
R squared = .611 (adjusted R squared = .602) 
 
Table 7. Mean Values of Expected Social Capital Gains 
 Low PD High PD Mean 
Low NM 2.52 5.53 4.03 
High NM 5.02 4.87 4.95 
Mean 3.77 5.20  
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Figure 3. Mean Plot of Expected Social Capital Gains 
 
5.5 Results on No-Action 
A binary logistic regression was performed to test the 
effects of privacy risks, expected social capital gains, 
and dispositional privacy concerns on no-action. 
Overall, out of the 141 subjects, 64 chose no-action 
(77 subjects performed either acceptance or 
rejection). Before fitting the logistic regression 
models with no-action as outcome (see Table 8), we 
computed the standardized scores for privacy risks, 
expected social capital gains, and dispositional 
privacy concerns. The Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 is 0.24, 
hence the binary logistic regression model predicts 
about 24% of no-action. As shown in Table 8, both 
privacy risks (β = -1.09, p <0.01) and expected social 
capital gains (β = -2.57, p <0.01) are found to have 
significant negative effects on no-action. Therefore, 
H3a and H4a are supported. Since the two-way 
interactions and three-way interactions are significant, 
further analysis was conducted to investigate the 
higher order interaction effects. 
 
Table 8. Logistic Regression on No-Action (N = 141) 
Model Fit 
  Likelihood ratio chi-square 58.23 
  Degrees of freedom 5 
  Significance p <0.01 
  Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.24 
Predictors β SE Wald Sig OR 
95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Estimate 2.65 4.56 5.32 p <0.01 2.85   
ESCG -2.57 0.22 6.71 p <0.01 2.79 -1.44 -1.05 
PR -1.09 0.36 5.10 p <0.01 2.61 -4.41 -2.02 
DPC -0.91 0.17 4.23 p <0.01 2.13 -3.12 -1.31 
ESCG*PR -2.49 0.44 9.93 p <0.01 3.23 -1.82 -1.43 
ESCG*DPC -0.80 0.13 5.28 p <0.01 2.86 -1.74 -1.05 
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PR*DPC -0.94 0.19 3.29 p <0.01 1.98 -1.64 -1.01 
ESCG*PR*DPC -0.85 0.13 1.24 p <0.05 1.24 -1.35 -1.02 
  PR = Low 
    ESCG -1.89 0.29 10.29 p <0.01 5.48 -10.95 -1.16 
    DPC -0.52 0.17 3.93 p <0.01 1.81 -1.82 -1.43 
  PR = High 
    ESCG -1.05 0.26 5.11 p <0.01 1.80 -1.94 -1.21 
    DPC -0.44 0.15 8.83 p <0.01 1.91 -1.86 -1.48 
  DPC = Low 
    ESCG*PR -0.94 0.45 4.33 p <0.05 1.40 -1.59 -1.19 
  DPC = High 
    ESCG*PR -0.53 0.24 4.92 p <0.05 1.42 -1.57 -1.37 
 
Following past research, to facilitate interpretation of 
the interaction effects, we performed median-split on 
privacy risks. Since the mean of privacy risks was 3.6, 
continuous scores that were less than or equal to 3.6 
were coded as 0 (i.e., low privacy risks), whereas 
continuous scores that were greater than 3.6 were 
coded as 1 (i.e., high privacy risks). When privacy risks 
are low, for every unit change in expected social 
capital gains, the log odds of no-action reduces by -
1.89. When privacy risks were high, the log odds of 
no-action reduced by -1.05. The results imply that 
compared to low privacy risks, with high privacy risks, 
expected social capital gains lead to less reduction in 
no-action likelihood. Therefore, H5a is supported. 
5.6 Results on Acceptance 
Since rejections and acceptance are opposite actions, 
we conducted a binary logistic regression (N = 77) to 
test how privacy risks, expected social capital gains, 
and dispositional privacy concerns affected 
acceptance. 
Table 9 presents the result of the logistic regression 
analysis with acceptance as the outcome variable. The 
Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 is 0.29, hence privacy risks, 
expected social capital gains, and dispositional privacy 
concerns predict about 29% of acceptance. As shown 
in Table 9, privacy risks (β = -1.78, p <0.01) were 
found to have a significant positive effect on 
acceptance, whereas expected social capital gains (β = 
1.31, p <0.01) had a significant negative effect on 
acceptance. Therefore, H3b and H4b are supported. 
Since both the two-way interactions and three-way 
interactions are significant, we conducted further 
analysis to investigate the higher order interaction 
effects. 
 
Table 9. Logistic Regression on Acceptance (N = 77) 
Model Fit 
  Likelihood ratio chi-square 32.97 
  Degrees of freedom 5 
  Significance p <0.01 
  Cox & Snell pseudo R2 0.29 
Predictors β SE Wald Sig OR 
95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Estimate        
ESCG 1.31 0.58 14.56 p <0.01 5.61 1.44 7.89 
PR -1.78 0.21 17.42 p <0.01 6.97 -9.00 -1.87 
DPC -1.60 0.32 10.01 p <0.01 5.51 -7.78 -1.54 
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ESCG*PR 1.43 0.32 7.54 p <0.01 2.23 1.34 1.88 
ESCG*DPC 1.16 0.30 8.97 p <0.01 3.05 1.14 2.31 
PR*DPC -2.21 0.27 24.47 p <0.01 9.77 -12.45 -2.31 
ESCG*PR*DPC 0.79 0.21 7.21 p <0.05 2.02 1.38 1.81 
  PR = Low 
    ESCG 1.23 0.11 8.87 p <0.01 3.13 1.30 1.87 
    DPC -1.29 0.21 9.45 p <0.01 3.07 -1.84 -1.03 
  PR = High 
    ESCG 0.24 0.21 2.33 p =0.11 (N.S.) 1.00 0.49 0.97 
    DPC -1.90 0.20 14.21 p <0.01 5.47 1.30 8.56 
  DPC = Low 
    ESCG*PR 1.30 0.19 7.76 p <0.01 2.51 1.05 1.75 
  DPC = High 
    ESCG*PR 0.07 0.26 2.01 p =0.31 (N.S.) 0.91 0.08 0.51 
When privacy risk was low, for every one-unit 
change in expected social capital gains, the log odds 
of acceptance increased by 1.23. When privacy risks 
were high, the effect of expected social capital gains 
on acceptance was not significant (β = 0.24, p =0.11). 
The results imply that compared to low privacy risks, 
with high privacy risks, expected social capital gains 
lead to less increase in acceptance likelihood. 
Therefore, H5b is supported. 
Furthermore, when dispositional privacy concerns 
were low, for every unit change in expected social 
capital gains and privacy risk collectively, the log 
odds of acceptance increased by 1.30. When 
dispositional privacy concerns were high, the joint 
effect of expected social capital gains and privacy risk 
on acceptance was not significant (β = 0.07, p =0.31). 
The results imply that compared to low dispositional 
privacy concerns, the interaction effect on acceptance 
between expected social capital gains and privacy risk 
is stronger when dispositional privacy concerns are 
high. Therefore, H6 is supported. 
5.7 Common Method Bias 
Following the recommendation of Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) and past IS 
research (Jiang et al., 2013), we tested for possible 
common method bias by conducting confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) for two models. First, we 
estimated a six-factor model, which included six 
constructs in the research model with privacy 
concerns consisting of four first-order factors. Each of 
the 24 measurement items was restricted to being an 
indicator for the respective latent factor. Fit indices of 
the first model (α2 [237] = 258.1) were as follows: 
α2/df = 1.09, SRMR = 0.421, RMSEA = 0.012, NFI = 
0.953, CFI = 0.992, GFI = 0.912, AGFI = 0.823, TLI 
= 0.990. Generally, these indices satisfied the 
recommended thresholds and hence indicate a good 
fit of the model to the data. 
In the second model, in addition to the six factors 
examined in the first model, we conducted a CFA 
with one additional factor to represent the 
unmeasured common method. We allowed each of 
the 24 items to load on its respective theoretical factor 
construct, and all were allowed to load on the 
additional method factor, which was constrained to be 
uncorrelated with the other ten factors. The fit indices 
for the second model (α2 [213] = 232.3) were largely 
identical to those of the first model (α2/df = 1.09, 
SRMR = 0.422, RMSEA = 0.012, NFI = 0.951, CFI = 
0.990, GFI = 0.911, AGFI = 0.821, TLI = 0.990). 
Furthermore, a chi-square test comparing the first 
model with the second model indicated that the 
difference between the two models was not 
significant (α2 [24] = 25.8, p = 0.36, N.S.), suggesting 
that the common method bias was not a serious 
concern. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 Discussion of Results 
The results are in support of our hypotheses. We seek 
to enrich the understanding of social connectivity 
regulation in online social networks by considering 
the effects of privacy risks as well as expected social 
capital gains associated with social connectivity. We 
establish that the responder’s perceptions of both 
costs and benefits influence their behavioral 
responses to the establishment of social network 
connections. We also hope to achieve a more 
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comprehensive understanding of social connectivity 
regulation by examining network mutuality and 
requester profile diagnosticity, which we derived 
based on the two main types of social information in 
interpersonal cognition—namely, category-based 
information and attribute-based information 
respectively. Our findings show that network 
mutuality and requester profile diagnosticity are 
important determinants of privacy risks and expected 
social capital gains in establishing social connectivity. 
We also seek to explain the different roles of 
dispositional privacy concerns and privacy calculus in 
affecting individuals’ behavioral responses (i.e., no-
action and acceptance) to establishing online social 
network connections. We demonstrate that privacy 
risks moderate the impact of expected social capital 
gains on behavioral responses. More importantly, we 
enhance the information privacy literature by 
clarifying the distinct roles of dispositional privacy 
concerns. Our findings reveal that dispositional 
privacy concerns alter the different impacts of privacy 
calculus on behavioral responses. 
6.2 Theoretical Contribution 
This study enriches the privacy literature in several 
ways. First, past IS research examining privacy issues 
in online social networks has devoted little attention 
to social connectivity regulation. This lack of 
attention to the establishment of social connections is 
somewhat surprising since a prime reason for 
individuals to adopt online social networks is to 
establish, develop, and maintain social connections. 
On the basis of the privacy calculus perspective, we 
identify privacy risks and expected social capital 
gains, as the cost and benefit elements of a privacy 
calculus, whereby individuals consider the privacy 
threats and social benefits in establishing social 
connectivity. Our findings show that privacy risks and 
expected social capital gains are indeed important 
determinants of individuals’ responses to requests for 
social network connections. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to employ the notion 
of privacy calculus to understand distinct behavioral 
responses to establishing social connectivity. 
Second, we contribute to the IS literature by 
providing evidence on the importance of impression 
formation in regulating social connectivity. While 
past studies have identified a myriad of factors 
pertinent to privacy perceptions, rarely have 
researchers examined the effects of social information 
processing on individuals’ assessment of privacy 
threats and social benefits. Based on impression 
formation theory, this study identifies two important 
types of social information cues that influence 
privacy calculus; namely, network mutuality and 
requester’s profile diagnosticity. Specifically, 
network mutuality is a type of social category-based 
information, which invokes relational frames to 
facilitate social categorization. Profile diagnosticity 
concerns the details of requester-specific information, 
which is essential for individualization in social 
information processing. Taken as a whole, we 
combine impression formation and privacy calculus 
and then show the efficacy of this integrative 
approach in the context of online social networks. 
Third, to our best knowledge, this is one of the first 
studies to formally examine the interplay between 
dispositional privacy concerns and privacy calculus. 
Given the transactional nature of privacy calculus, it 
is surprising that past research has paid little attention 
to recognizing the difference. Drawing on Xu et al. 
(2012) and Li (2011), we proposed that privacy 
calculus and dispositional privacy concerns are 
independent concepts. Our findings show that privacy 
calculus is indeed distinct from dispositional privacy 
concerns. More importantly, our results reveal that 
the impacts of perceived benefits (i.e., expected social 
capital gains) on behavioral responses are moderated 
by individuals’ judgment of risks (i.e., privacy risks). 
6.3 Practical Contributions 
Our findings have important implications for 
application designers as well as online social 
networks providers. Application designers for online 
social networks often provide mechanisms that 
address users’ perception of privacy risks. While 
mechanisms that address privacy risks are somewhat 
common, few design efforts have been devoted to 
enhancing the appreciation of expected social capital 
gains. To this end, we advocate a design strategy that 
improves the recognition of expected social capital 
gains. As predicted by the proposed model, expected 
social capital gains are found to be enhanced by 
higher network mutuality and requester profile 
diagnosticity. While this result is largely consistent 
with conventional wisdom, a more interesting finding 
of this study is probably that the effect of profile 
diagnosticity on expected social capital gains is more 
pronounced in the low network mutuality condition 
than in the high network mutuality condition. This 
finding suggests that the richness of profile detail is 
crucial for relationship development between users 
who do not share a high degree of social 
commonality. This is because a rich profile provides 
vivid details about the requester, thereby reducing the 
responder’s uncertainties and enhancing interpersonal 
understanding. Thus, it is important that application 
designers consider providing mechanisms that help 
enhance requester’s profile diagnosticity, such as 
providing photo album previews and timeline 
abstracts in online social network platforms. 
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6.4 Limitations and Future Directions 
This study examines the establishment of online 
social network connections between unfamiliar 
others. While we focus on a requester who shares 
some mutual friends with the request responder, we 
do not attempt to generalize the results to friend 
requests made from total strangers. In such a case, 
since the requester does not share any common 
friends with the responder, network mutuality may 
not come into play. Additionally, this study focuses 
on privacy risks and expected social capital gains as 
the cost and benefit components of privacy calculus. 
It is possible that individuals might consider other 
potential benefits in evaluating requests to establish 
online social network connections. For instance, 
individuals might accept connection requests to 
increase their social connection number as a means to 
signal their popularity (i.e., social enhancement). 
Additionally, they might accept new connection 
requests for entertainment value (e.g., thrill derived 
from the opportunity to interact with unfamiliar 
others). We encourage future studies to explore 
additional manifestation of privacy calculus pertinent 
to developing online social network connections. 
It might also be worthy to note that our contributions 
may be limited by using a mock-up Facebook 
website. Although the mock-up website largely 
resembled the general layout and appearance of the 
website, the mock-up website may not entirely reflect 
the actual social networking environment. Despite 
this limitation, the mock-up environment allowed us 
to manipulate the experimental conditions, which 
would have otherwise been impossible in the actual 
environment. Since we used Facebook as the 
experimental environment, this study focused on 
network mutuality (which is readily available in a 
friend request) to represent category-based 
information, and used profile diagnosticity (which 
can be determined through explicit deliberation) to 
represent attribute-based information. It is possible 
that the two types of impression formation 
information might manifest differently in other 
contexts. Furthermore, some recent statistical 
evidence suggests that there may be more female than 
male users on Facebook. Caution should be taken in 
generalizing our findings to specific user types. 
Furthermore, this study focuses on network mutuality 
as the social information cue for relationship category 
in forming impressions. It is important to note that 
other types of social information cues might also help 
activate relationship categories in developing 
impressions. For instance, when the requester and the 
responder are both fans of a football team, the 
relational frame for close relationships might be 
activated. Likewise, depending on the requester’s 
marital status and professional affiliations, responders 
might assume vastly different relationship categories in 
impression development. To this end, we believe our 
research provides a robust theoretical framework that 
will help future studies explore other intriguing social 
information cues pertinent to online social networking.  
It is also worthy of noting that online social 
networking websites have implemented a range of 
features whereby individuals can regulate the 
visibility of their social updates. For instance, on 
Facebook, users might explicitly exclude certain 
online friends from seeing their postings, and hence 
limit their privacy exposures. Furthermore, users 
might expect less privacy risks when their profile 
contains limited information. However, despite the 
availability of such privacy protection features and 
variation in profile content, evidence suggests that 
individuals largely ignore such visibility-regulation 
mechanisms and choose to continue using the default 
visibility settings, which typically expose individuals’ 
existing disclosure and future disclosure (e.g., social 
updates, photos posting, and comments) to their 
online friends (Turner 2016). We encourage scholars 
to examine whether and how users adopt new privacy 
protection features, and how differences in profile 
content influence online social connectivity 
management. Lastly, this study identifies rejection 
and acceptance as the two key behavioral responses to 
online social network connection establishment. The 
recent introduction of visibility and audience 
management features by major social networking 
platforms could facilitate richer response behaviors. 
For instance, on Facebook, users might categorize 
friends into different types, which allows various 
levels of visibility concerning users’ profile content. 
Likewise, Google+ allows users to classify friends 
into different social circles, which are assigned 
different levels of accessibility to users’ profiles. 
Hence, it would be interesting for future research to 
examine how behavioral responses might manifest in 
such environments. 
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Appendix 
Key Impressions formation 
studies Category-based information Attribute-based information 
Kunda and Thagard (1996) Occupation stereotypes (i.e., accountant vs. 
construction worker) 
Behaviors (i.e., unaggressive vs. aggressive) 
Greenlees, Buscombe, Thelwell, 
Holder, and Rimmer (2005) 
Apparel (i.e., tennis-specific vs. general 
sportswear) 
Body languages (i.e., positive vs. negative) 
Freeman and Ambady (2011) Visual information (i.e., face and body cues) Auditory input (i.e., voice cues) 
Wyer (2010) Physical appearance (i.e., visibly shaved 
head) 
Behavioral evidence (i.e., behaviors in a party) 
Epley and Kruger (2005) Photograph appearance (i.e., Asian 
American vs. African American) 
Communication (i.e., e-mail vs. voice) 
Gawronski et al. (2003) Gender (i.e., male vs. female) Individual responsibility (i.e., domestic vs. work) 
Park, Kim, and Kim (2002) Category similarity (i.e., a new grocery food 
vs. a nonfood product) 
Benefit typicality information (i.e., brand 
typicality vs. brand atypicality) 
Ko, Judd, and Stapel (2009) Applicant gender (i.e., female vs. male) Resume content (i.e., feminine vs. masculine) 
Hosoda, Stone-Romero, and 
Coats (2003) 
Physical attractiveness (i.e., attractive vs. 
unattractive) 
Job nature descriptions (i.e., feminine job vs. 
masculine job) 
Blair, Chapleau, and Judd 
(2005) 
Racial category (i.e., Afrocentric features) Diagnostic information (i.e., aggressive responses 
vs. nonaggressive responses) 
Chun and Kruglanski (2006) Occupation types (i.e., engineers vs. 
nonengineers) 
Individuating information (i.e., easy to process 
vs. difficult to process) 
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